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Introduction 
The landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision, Crawford v. Washington,1 has 
completely changed the traditional framework2 for evaluating the admissibility of 
testimonial hearsay in criminal trials.  The decision revives the authority found under the 
6th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, specifically, one’s right to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him in a criminal trial.3 Although the decision has only recently been 
released, practitioners, courts, and academics alike recognize the enormous impact the 
case will have on Confrontation Clause analysis.4 The following is an analysis of the 
Crawford decision and its impact on the admissibility of testimonial hearsay.  This 
analysis provides a brief overview of the traditional framework used prior to the 
Crawford decision in analyzing hearsay statements in relation to the Confrontation 
Clause, the law as it stands now and a brief overview of some questions the Court left 
unanswered.  Lastly, this analysis takes a look at the recent Alaska Court of Appeals case, 
 
1 124 S.Ct 1354 (2004). 
2 Traditional in terms of the last 25 years. 
3 U.S. Const. Amend. VI. 
4 Valladares, Rene L., Forsman, Franny A., Crawford v. Washington: The Confrontation Clause Gets 
Teeth, 12 Nevada Lawyer 12 at 14 (September, 2004) recognizing that Crawford will have significant 
ramifications for criminal law practitioners in the State of Nevada (Mr. Valladares and Ms. Forsman are 
both Assistant Federal Public Defenders for the District of Nevada); see also States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 
832, n.1. (Where Circuit Judge Richard S. Arnold described Crawford as a “case of great importance”)); 
see also Friedman, Richard D., ADJUSTING TO CRAWFORD: High Court Decision Restores 
Confrontation Clause Protection, 19 Criminal Justice 4, at 5 (2004) (Where professor Friedman of the 
University of Michigan Law School recognizes Crawford’s radical impact on Confrontation Clause 
doctrine.)  
Anderson v. State of Alaska,5 and other Ninth Circuit cases that have interpreted 
Crawford, and the impact these decisions will have on future evidence and Confrontation 
jurisprudence in Alaska.     
Factual Context 
Michel Crawford was tried for assault and attempted murder after stabbing a man 
who allegedly tried to rape his wife, Sylvia.6 Crawford claimed self-defense.  At trial the 
prosecution played the tape-recorded statements of Sylvia describing the stabbing, which 
she had made during police interrogation.7 Sylvia’s statements were not entirely 
consistent with her husbands as to the sequence of events leading up to the stabbing.  At 
his initial interrogation Crawford testified that he thought the victim had been reaching 
for a weapon of some sort just before he stabbed him.8 Sylvia’s statements corroborated 
her husband’s story for the most part, however, it was arguably different with regards to 
whether the victim had drawn a weapon before Crawford stabbed him.9 Sylvia did not 
testify at trial because of the marital privilege.  Washington’s marital privilege does not 
extend to a spouse’s out-of-court statements where the statements would be admissible 
under a hearsay exception.10 The state used the “statement against penal interest” 
exception to the general exclusion of hearsay statements, based on the fact that Sylvia 
had led her husband to the victim’s home and helped facilitate the assault.11 The 
prosecution used the statements to prove that the stabbing was not in self-defense despite 
 
5 ---P.3d---, 2005 WL 858773 (Alaska App. April 15, 2005). 
6 Crawford, 124 S.Ct at 1355 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 1357 
9 Id.  
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
Crawford’s inability to cross-examine his wife.12 Crawford argued that despite state law, 
by admitting Sylvia’s statements without the opportunity to cross-examine her, the state 
was violating his Sixth Amendment right to be "confronted with the witnesses against 
him." 13 
The trial court adhered to the traditional “adequate ‘indicia of reliability” 
framework laid out in Ohio v. Roberts, 100 S.Ct. 2531 (1980), allowing statements of 
unavailable witnesses to be introduced as evidence if the statement falls within a “firmly 
rooted hearsay exception” or bears “particularized guarantees of reliability.”14 The trial 
court allowed the statements to be introduced, finding that the statements bore particular 
guarantees of reliability.15 The Washington State Supreme Court unanimously upheld 
Crawford’s conviction on similar grounds.16 The court reasoned that the statement was 
reliable because it was nearly identical to Crawford's own statement to the police, in that 
both were ambiguous as to whether the victim had drawn a weapon before petitioner 
assaulted him. 17 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to determine 
whether the introduction of Sylvia’s statements at her husband’s trial violated the 
Confrontation Clause.18 In a unanimous decision the Court reversed the Washington 
Supreme Courts ruling in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia.19 
Historical Background of the Confrontation Clause and Its Effect on Hearsay 
 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 1358 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 124 S.Ct. at 1358 
16 Id. 
17 147 Wash.2d, at 438,439, 54 P.3d, at 664 
18 23 S.Ct. 2275 (2003) 
19 The Chief Justice and Justice O’Connor felt that the statement sought to be introduced did not meet the 
criteria laid out in Roberts, while the other seven justices pointed out the inherent flaws with the Roberts 
framework and adopted an entirely different approach as to the question of the admissibility of testimonial 
hearsay. 
Justice Scalia does an excellent job at tracing the historical progression of the 
Confrontation Clause and its impact on the admissibility of testimonial hearsay 
statements stemming all the way back to Roman times.  For purposes of this paper it is 
much more useful to focus on the law as it stood just prior to the Crawford decision.  
First, however, it is important to begin with a fundamental review of what the plain 
language of the Confrontation Clause requires, and generally what hearsay actually is. 
The Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” 20 The 
basic premise is that, in our judicial system an accused cannot be tried with the aid of 
testimony of a witness whom the accused has not had a chance to confront.21 Applying 
that language strictly, it would mean that the introduction of any statements, made out of 
court, without the declarant available for cross examination, would be unconstitutional. 
Therefore, prosecutors, in order to introduce out-of-court testimonial statements, would 
have to present the declarant at trial or forego introduction of the statements into 
evidence.  However, such a strict approach has never been applied and it has generally 
been accepted that rendering all hearsay inadmissible would be impractical.22 Thus, 
exactly what the Confrontation Clause requires has been subject to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation and the development of evidence law of individual states over the years.  
The Crawford decision offers not a new interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, but 
adherence to the traditional meaning of the clause.23 
20 Id. 
21 Friedman, 19 Criminal Justice 4, at 5  
22Id. 
23 Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1359-60 (Author Justice Scalia provides a detailed historical analysis on the 
development of the Confrontation Clause stemming from its Roman roots through its common law 
development.) 
While reading this it helps to keep in mind that hearsay is strictly an evidence issue 
whereas Confrontation is a constitutional right.  The two are not synonymous and the fact 
that one is at issue does not necessarily mean the other will arise as well.  Hearsay, 
simply put, is “an out of court statement used to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”24 
Hearsay includes such things as words, documents, and nonverbal conduct that was 
intended to be an assertion (i.e. pointing, initialing invoices, smile coupled with silence, 
other physical acts).  Under the Federal Rules of Evidence the general rule is that hearsay 
is not admissible,25 however, this rule is subject to significant exceptions.26 The 
Crawford decision, as well as this paper, only addresses a specific kind of hearsay called 
“testimonial hearsay.”  The definition of testimonial hearsay is not entirely clear since the 
Crawford Court expressly failed to provide a comprehensive definition (addressed in the 
section dealing with questions left unanswered below) but it basically encompasses 
statements made in previous court-like proceedings and in circumstances where it is 
likely that they will be used later in court proceedings.  A more comprehensive definition 
of “testimonial hearsay” is provided below, but first a background review of the law as it 
stood just before Crawford is merited.      
 Just prior to the Crawford decision the admissibility of out of court testimonial 
witness statements was addressed through the framework laid out in Ohio v. Roberts.27 
Under the Roberts’ framework, basically any hearsay statement that posed a 
confrontation issue could nevertheless be admitted if it satisfied certain criteria.  
Specifically, the statement would be admitted, despite the Confrontation Clause, if it bore 
24 Professor Ann Murphy, Evidence lecture at Gonzaga University School of Law (Fall Semester- 2003) 
25 Fed. R. Evid. 802. 
26 Fed. R. Evid. 803, 804, 807. 
27 100 S.Ct. 2531 (1980)   
adequate “indicia of reliability”.28 To be deemed reliable, courts would look to whether 
the statement fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or was supported by 
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”29 In some circumstances there was the 
added requirement that the declarant be unavailable to testify.30 
Over the years the Roberts’ framework and its offspring had drawn skepticism as 
being too unpredictable, unmanageable, and in violation of the Confrontation Clause.31 
The Crawford decision delivered the deathblow to the use of the Roberts’ framework 
with regards to testimonial hearsay.  The Court scrutinized the Roberts’ framework’s 
shortcomings, and pointed to the fact that reliability is dependent upon a judge’s own 
interpretation on which factors are important and how much weight will be afforded 
those factors in different or similar circumstances, for different or similar reasons,32 and 
that such inconsistency is not allowed by the Confrontation Clause when determining the 
reliability of a statement.33 Moreover, the Court found that “the unpardonable vice of the 
Roberts test is its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the 
 
28 Id. 110 S.Ct. at 2531 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Friedman, 19 Criminal Justice 4, at 5. 
32 See Id. at 6 (providing numerous examples of inconsistencies between courts including a situation where 
a state Supreme Court found a statement more reliable because its inculpation of the defendant was 
“detailed” while the Fourth Circuit found a statement more reliable because the portion implicating another 
was “fleeting”); see also Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1372 (pointing out “… the trial court admitted [Sylvia’s] 
statement, listing several reasons why it was reliable. In its opinion reversing, the Court of Appeals listed 
several other reasons why the statement was not reliable. Finally, the State Supreme Court relied 
exclusively on the interlocking character of the statement and disregarded every other factor the lower 
courts had considered. The case is thus a self-contained demonstration of Roberts' unpredictable and 
inconsistent application.” 
33 Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1369-70.  (Finding that the Roberts test departs from historical confrontation 
principles because it admits statements consisting of ex parte testimony upon a mere reliability finding, and 
that the test’s unpredictable nature is apparent by its very nature because “whether a statement is deemed 
reliable depends on which factors a judge considers and how much weight he accords each of them.”) 
Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude.”34 The Court finally solidified what 
many skeptics/scholars had been preaching: reliability is not something to be left to the 
creativity of one’s advocate or the whims or any particular judge, instead the 
Confrontation Clause “commands … that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: 
by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”35 
The Law Derived From Crawford- The New Test 
So what exactly has Crawford left us with?  Is all the previous hearsay and 
Confrontation Clause precedent now null and void?  Is the Roberts’ framework 
completely dead?  Is Crawford now the ultimate authority on the admissibility of 
hearsay?  What is the new test?  Maintaining an all-encompassing perspective is the only 
way to approach these questions.  One must keep in mind the two areas dealt with here, 
hearsay and the Confrontation Clause.  These are separate creatures, each with a rather 
expansive precedential history.  First, I will examine the test to be taken from Crawford,
the parameters of that test, and some of the questions/issues that the decision leaves 
unanswered.  Finally, I will touch on some areas of the law that Crawford has left 
untouched. 
The Test 
The test derived from Crawford is the result of an excellent exercise in logic 
formulated by Justice Scalia.  Even if one disagrees with the decision, praise must be 
given for its craftsmanship.  Building upon Justice Scalia’s extensive background 
 
34 Id. 124 S.Ct at 1370-71 (Finding that, “[w]here testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the 
Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much 
less to amorphous notions of "reliability.”"). 
35 Id. 124 S.Ct at 1370-71, 1364 (finding that the Constitution prescribes the procedure for determining the 
reliability of testimony in criminal trials, and the Supreme Court, no less than the state courts, lacks the 
authority to replace it with one of its own devising, and that “leaving the regulation of out-of-court 
statements to the law of evidence would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the 
most flagrant inquisitorial practices.”) 
analysis of the Confrontation Clause, the Court determined that the Clause’s history 
supported two general principles about the purposes of the Confrontation Clause.   
First, the Court determined that the most overriding purpose of the Confrontation 
Clause was to protect criminal defendants from the civil law method of criminal 
procedure, that is, preventing the use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the 
accused, the overall goal being reliability of evidence.36 Furthermore, the Court 
determined that the focus of the Clause within the previously mentioned purpose was 
upon witnesses against the accused or those who offer testimony.37 Thus the primary 
object of concern for the Confrontation Clause is  “testimonial hearsay” (term discussed 
below).38 The Court rejected the view that the Confrontation Clause only applies to in-
court testimony “and that its application to out-of-court statements introduced at trial 
depends upon "the law of Evidence for the time being."”39 A clear understanding of 
Crawford dictates that this sort of approach to the Confrontation Clause is inconsistent 
with the nature of the Clause as well as traditional principles of constitutional law.  
The second principal supported by the Court’s historical investigation was “that 
the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness 
who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had 
a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”40 This exception was incorporated into the 6th 
Amendment from English common law, which the Court determined was the only 
 
36 Crawford, 124 S.Ct at 1364,1370. (“To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of 
evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be 
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination.”) 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. (quoting 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1397, p. 101 (2d ed.1923); accord, Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 
94, 91 S.Ct. 210 (1970). 
40 Id. 124 S.Ct. at 1365 
exception envisioned by the drafters since the language found in the 6th Amendment 
leaves no open exceptions and this was the only exception in existence at the time the 
provision was drafted.41 
Thus the general rule to be taken from the Crawford decision is this: if the out of 
court statement is testimonial, and the declarant is unavailable, the statement is 
inadmissible as evidence against the defendant, unless the defendant had previously had 
an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 
Parameters of Test- Questions Left Unanswered? 
It appears that for every answer the Crawford decision offers two questions are 
created.  On its face the test seems simple enough, however a second look offers glaring 
gaps when its use is sought in the arena of practical application.  The three linchpins to 
the test are the words/phrases: “testimonial”, declarant “unavailability”, and “previous 
opportunity to cross-examine” the declarant.  Stop for a second and put on your lawyer 
hat.  Even if given their colloquial meanings, all three linchpins beg for an attorney’s 
creative interpretation.  The test is much more like a constitution than a steadfast rule of 
law in that it functions more as a guide, outlining the parameters of the law.   To say the 
least, Crawford may have reduced the level of the pond but the water remains as muddy 
as ever.       
Hands down, the most exasperating aspect of the Crawford decision is the fact 
that the Court failed to answer probably the most obvious question one would ask: what 
exactly constitutes testimonial hearsay?  In fact, not only did the Court simply overlook 
 
41 Id. 
this problem, the Court expressly declined to offer any concrete definition.42 Courts 
across the country now have the task of filling this void.  However, the Court did offer 
some guidance on this issue.  For instance, it noted that certain types of hearsay like off-
hand remarks, business records, and statements in furtherance of a conspiracy are not, by 
their nature “testimonial”.43 Another exclusion may be dying declarations.  However, the 
Court failed to definitively answer this question, instead offering only that if the dying 
declaration exception must be accepted on historical grounds it is “sui generis”.44 
Whereas the Court did offer, “[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a 
minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former 
trial; and to police interrogations. These are the modern practices with closest kinship to 
the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed.”45 Professor Friedman offers 
a more workable outline.46 He determined that the Court offered three standards but did 
not choose any one of them for determining what makes a statement “testimonial”, they 
include: 1.) “ex-parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material 
such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable 
 
42 See Id. at FN.10 (Where the Court recognized that failing to provide a comprehensive definition would 
lead to uncertainty for a while but eventually will be resolved, but noted that the uncertainty developed by 
this decision maintains the status quo (Roberts framework), and that the problem with the Roberts 
framework was inherent and therefore permanent whereas the interim problem here is not.)   
43 Id. 124 S.Ct. at 1367 
44 Id. (meaning that the exception is “unique” or “peculiar”) See Black’s Law Dictionary 1448 (7th Ed. 
1999). For one Court’s take on dying declarations see United States v. Jordan, 2005 WL 513501 (D. Co. 
March 3, 2005) (excluding dying declarations that identify a killer to investigators, unless it can be shown 
that the killers motivation was the desire to prevent the victim from testifying.) 
45 Id. 124 S.Ct. at 1374; see also Id. at 124 S.Ct. at 1364 (where the Court identified different formulations 
of a core class of “testimonial” statements such as "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent--
that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to 
cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorially," (citing Brief for Petitioner 23); "extra-judicial statements ... contained in formalized 
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,"(citing White v. 
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365, 112 S.Ct. 736 (1992))). 
46 Professor Richard D. Friedman of the University of Michigan Law School submitted an amicus brief on 
behalf of eight other law professors and himself in the Crawford case, additionally he sat second chair to 
petitioner’s counsel, Jeffery Fisher, at the oral arguments in the Supreme Court. 
to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect 
to be used prosecutorially;” 2.) “extra-judicial statements … formalized in testimonial 
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions” and 3.) 
statements made in situations where an objective witness would conclude that they would 
later be used in trial.47 Given the Court’s vagueness on this issue it is unavoidable, at 
least in the interim, that absent a concrete definition from them each jurisdiction will 
develop their own interpretations and tests as to what constitutes a “testimonial” 
statement inevitably resulting in inconsistency.48 
The Court placed some emphasis on situations involving governmental 
involvement in the elicitation of the statement.49 No doubt in such circumstances it 
would seem the most likely context in which a testimonial statement would arise.  The 
Court offered this distinction, “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government 
officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an 
acquaintance does not.”50 This is not to say that the presence or involvement of 
government officials will be the determining factor as to whether the statement is 
 
47 Friedman, 19 Criminal Justice 4, at 9 
48 See Valladares, 12 Nevada Lawyer 12 at 14 (“Courts across the country are churning out Crawford-
related opinions at breakneck speed. The results of some of these post-Crawford cases are somewhat 
contradictory and reflect a tendency to apply a more narrow view of what is testimonial. In a New York 
case, which could have a big impact on domestic violence prosecutions, the state unsuccessfully sought to 
introduce a 9-1-1 tape that described an ongoing shooting. The court found that the contents of the tape 
were testimonial, because the dispatcher elicited detailed information from the caller regarding the event.  
People v. Cortes, 2004 WL 1258018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., May 26, 2004).  Likewise, a California court held that 
the statements by assault victims to a police officer were testimonial, as they were the product of police 
questioning. People v. Adams, No. C040891, 2004 WL 1637965 (Cal. Ct. App. July 22, 2004). On the other 
hand, a North Carolina appellate court found that victim statements made to a police officer immediately 
after being rescued from a kidnapping were non-testimonial, because they were spontaneously initiated by 
the victim. State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).”)”. 
49 Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1364-65 and n.7 on 1367 
50 Id. 
testimonial or not, although it tends to lend itself as such in most situations.51 To the 
contrary, there are many situations where such a standard would seem ridiculous.52 
Similarly the Court was equally evasive when explaining whether it is the 
perception of the declarant when making the statement that matters or whether it is the 
purpose of the government official, or the perception of the person obtaining the 
statement, that is determinative.  One practitioner claims that “[t]he Crawford case 
strongly implies that the status and motivations of the person eliciting the information, 
not the perceptions of the declarant, should determine whether the right attaches.”53 On 
the other hand the Court did quote, as an example of the different formulations of 
testimonial statements, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers Amicus 
brief which offered the opposite approach, "statements that were made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial[.]"54 Simply put, this “objective 
standard” places emphasis on the perception of the declarant and no one else.  Thus it 
would appear that arguments could be made on either side. 
 
51 See Hood III, Will and Padilla, Lucia, The Right To Confront Witnesses After Crawford v. Washinton, 33 
Colorado Lawyer 83, at 84-85 (September, 2004) (Comparing two Colorado Court of Appeal decisions that 
attempted to interpret the meaning of “testimonial statements” under Crawford, each of which indicated 
that government involvement was a necessary element if a statement is to be “testimonial”); but see 
Friedman, 19 Criminal Justice 4, at 9-10 (“I do not believe that participation by government official—either 
receipt of the statement as the initial audience of the statement or active procurement of the statement 
through interrogation—is the essence of what makes a statement testimonial.”);  
52 See Friedman, 19 Criminal Justice 4 at 9 (offering the following example: “if just before trial a person 
shoved a written statement under the courthouse door, asserting that the accused committed the crime, that 
would plainly be testimonial even though no government official played a role in preparing the statement.”) 
53 Hood III, 33 Colorado Lawyer 83, at 85 (Mr. Hood is “Of Counsel” at the Denver Firm Issaacson, 
Rosenbaum, Woods & Levy, P.C.) 
54 Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1364 (citing National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici 
Curiae at 3. 
The second linchpin to the test appears to be the least confusing.  As discussed 
below,55 the body of case law developed under the Roberts framework for determining 
when the declarant is unavailable has been left in place by the Court.  Additionally, under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence a declarant is unavailable for the purposes of offering 
hearsay evidence in the following situations: death or illness, refusal to testify, they are 
exempted by privilege, they cannot be found (absent), or they lack memory of the 
specific statement.56 Only time will tell whether a rule of evidence will be incorporated 
that expands or narrows this rule to take into consideration Crawford.
The last linchpin of the test offers not so much of an interpretational paradox as 
the testimonial definition issue but is of equal magnitude in terms of importance.  If the 
accused has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant than Confrontation 
has been satisfied.  Again, sounds simple, however, this aspect of the test poses some 
rather interesting questions and again is subject to creative lawyering given its vague 
standing.   
First off, does a prior opportunity to cross-examine a witness mean that the 
accused must actually cross-exam the witness or simply be afforded the opportunity to do 
so?57 This could be a particularly amorphous standard to develop.  Second, what is the 
benchmark for an adequate opportunity to cross-examine?  What happens when there are 
 
55 See supra at p.12 
56 Fed. R. Evid. 804(a) (establishes foundation one must lay for 804(b) exceptions to apply including 
former testimony.) 
57 See Friedman, 19 Criminal Justice 4 at 11 (offering the following example: a prosecutor notifies the 
defendant of his intention to use a witnesses statement at trial, and encourages the defendant to depose the 
witness and ensures their availability if the defendant chooses to do so.  Would the defendant be deemed to 
have waived his confrontation right if he decided not to depose the witness and the prosecution used the 
statement?); see also Friedman, Richard D., Shifting the Burden, The Confrontation Blog, (March 16, 
2005) at http://www.confrontationright.blogspot.com/  (citing Bratton v. State, 2005 WL 459019 (Tex. 
App. Dallas Feb. 28,2005), where the court rejected this tactic, as had State v. Cox, 876 So.2d 932 (La. 
App. 3d Cir. 2004)). 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel?  Will the standards be lowered for parties that 
decide to go to trial pro-se?  What happens when new facts/evidence is discovered by the 
defendant after his opportunity to cross-examine had taken place?  Will Crawford apply 
retroactively?58 Is there a point when it is too early to present the accused with an 
opportunity to cross-examine?  For example what if a prosecutor decided to take a 
deposition prior to charging an individual?  In some situations it would seem that offering 
the potential defendant an opportunity to cross-examine at this point would be 
inconsistent with the purpose of Confrontation Clause.  The whole idea behind the 
Confrontation Clause is to address the reliability of evidence through cross-examination.  
However, how is one to prepare a thorough cross-examination when all the issues have 
not been identified?  There must be a certain point where providing this opportunity 
would be inadequate.59 For example, assume Daren (D) is being investigated for criminal 
tax evasion and is given the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses against him at a 
deposition prior to his being charged.  Tax issues can be rather complex and time 
consuming even with adequate preparation.  Even if D had obtained competent counsel 
how early in the game is too early?  How would he know which issues to press or what 
information he needed to provide to his lawyer so as to prepare a defense.60 These 
questions make apparent there is significant room for argument.  Through the parameters 
outlined in Crawford courts across the country will have to answer these questions.         
58 See Valladares, Rene L., 12 Nevada Lawyer 12 at 15-16 for a comment on whether Crawford will apply 
retroactively. 
59 See People v. Smith, 2005 WL 294371 (Cal.App. 3 Div. 2005) (only Westlaw citation is available) 
(where a defendants fellow gang member made inculpatory statements to investigator at interrogation, 
testified only that he would not tesitify at the 1st trial, and refused to testify at 2nd trial, recorded 
interrogation was allowed and deemed not in violation of Crawford.) 
60 Friedman, 19 Criminal Justice 4 at 11. 
Law Left Unaffected by Crawford 
Through my research I have found an article, authored by an actual participant in 
the Crawford case that does an excellent job of explaining what law Crawford leaves 
untouched and what law Crawford will change.61 First, the Crawford decision did 
discard the traditional Roberts framework in situations where testimonial hearsay is at 
issue.62 Now it is inconsequential whether the testimonial hearsay statement falls under 
one of the many firmly rooted exceptions or whether the statement displays adequate 
indicia of reliability, when the statement is testimonial in nature the Confrontation stage 
is set.  However, this does not mean that Crawford is the new test for the admissibility of 
all hearsay, Roberts is still very much alive.63 It is important to remember that hearsay 
and the Confrontation Clause are two different areas of the law; they come together only 
when the statement at issue is testimonial in nature.64 Therefore, it is crucial to 
understand that where the statement at issue is “non-testimonial” Crawford places no 
restriction on it and Roberts is still viable.  This is not to say that Roberts’ framework is 
not open to further challenge.  To the contrary, given the strong language used by the 
Court denouncing Roberts, I believe Crawford provides ample ammunition for other 
challenges outside the testimonial hearsay arena, however this is an entirely different 
paper altogether.   
 
61 Id. (Professor Richard D. Friedman of the University of Michigan Law School submitted an amicus brief 
on behalf of eight other law professors and himself in the Crawford case, additionally he sat second chair to 
petitioner’s counsel, Jeffery Fisher, at the oral arguments in the Supreme Court.) 
62 Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1365 
63 Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1374 (finding that, “[where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly 
consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law--as 
does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny 
altogether.”  
64 Friedman, 19 Criminal Justice 4 at7 (indicating that the “question in each case is whether the given 
statement is testimonial, and the fact that a statement fits within a hearsay exception does not alter its status 
with respect to that question.) 
Second, the statement offered must be offered for the truth of the matter that it 
asserts, otherwise you do not have a confrontation issue65 nor even a hearsay issue for 
that matter.  Thus a prosecutor offering an out of court statement, if ethical, can make the 
argument that the statement is not being offered to shed light on the truth of what it 
asserts, but for some other reason such as offering the confession of a co-defendant 
simply to show that the confession is substantially different from the defendant’s own 
confession.66 
Third, the Crawford Court reaffirms the rule derived in California v. Green,67 that 
“[w]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause 
places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.”68 The obvious 
reason being that the declarant is available to answer questions as to the prior statements. 
“Fourth, in applying the unavailability requirement to prior testimony under the Roberts 
regime, the Court developed a body of case law concerning when the prosecution has 
adequately proven unavailability, and for better or worse that case law, including part of 
Roberts itself, is left untouched.”69 
Fifth, the traditional rule that one cannot benefit from their own misconduct still 
remains in effect and they will forfeit their confrontation right in such situations.70 For 
example one cannot cause the declarant to “disappear” or otherwise purposely impact the 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.  This leaves to question whether a murder 
suspect may exclude his victim’s statements on Confrontation grounds or whether this 
 
65 See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985) (which Crawford explicitly reaffirms, see Crawford, 
124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9.) 
66 See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 
67 399 U.S. 149 (1970) 
68 Friedman, 19 Criminal Justice 4 at 7-8; citing Crawford, 124 S.Ct at 1369 n.9 
69 Id. 19 Criminal Justice 4 at 8 
70 Id. 
qualifies as benefiting from their own misconduct.  Surely at the time the murder took 
place it was not the murder’s motive to prevent the victim from testifying as to his own 
murderer.  Such an argument would be absurd.     
Sixth, Professor Friedman “presumes” the rule established in Maryland v. Craig,
479 U.S. 836 (1990), will not be impacted by the Crawford decision.71 There, “the Court 
held that, upon a particularized showing that a child witness would be traumatized by 
having to testify in the presence of the accused, the child may testify in another room 
with the judge and counsel present but the jury and the accused connected 
electronically.”72 
Lastly, the Crawford decision does not disturb the rule derived from Delaware v. 
Van Arsdall,73 “that a violation of the confrontation right may be deemed harmless and 
therefore not require reversal.”74 As has been evidenced by numerous cases (discussed 
below).75 
Crawford’s Impact on Alaska 
 While writing this essay the Alaska Court of Appeals has handed down its first 
decision grappling with the Crawford issue, Anderson v. State of Alaska.76 The decision 
was handed down literally days ago at the time of the drafting of this essay. The court 
formulated its own interpretation of what the Crawford Court meant by “interrogation” 
and “testimonial” in adapting its test for the admissibility of testimonial hearsay.  In the 
 
71 Id.  
72 Id. (explaining that Crawford addresses when confrontation is required, whereas Craig addresses what 
procedures confrontation requires.) 
73 475 U.S. 673 (1986), 
74 Id. 
75 See supra at p.31-32  
76 Anderson, 2005 WL 858773. 
Anderson case police received a 911 call from a woman indicating that the defendant, 
Joseph Anderson, had assaulted her.77 When officers arrived on the scene they found a 
woman bleeding and very upset.78 The woman then told the police that someone else had 
been hurt as well and took them to an apartment were an injured man was lying on the 
floor.79 The officer at the scene noticed several bruises on the man’s torso and that he 
appeared to be in a lot of pain.80 At that point the officer asked the man, “What 
happened?” To which the man responded that “Joe” had hit him with a pipe.81 The 
injured man did not testify at Anderson’s trial, however, the trial court allowed the officer 
to testify as to his out-of-court statement identifying Anderson as the perpetrator, under 
the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.82 
Thus the issue before the Alaska Court of Appeals was whether the injured man’s 
response to the officer’s question was testimonial under Crawford. Despite some 
 
77 Id. 2005 WL 858773 at p. 1 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Alaska Evidence Rule 803(2) 
authority to the contrary83 the court decided to “follow the emerging majority view on the 
admissibility of excited responses to brief on-the-scene questioning by police officers.”84 
The majority view holds that “an excited utterance by a crime victim to a police officer, 
made in response to minimal questioning, is not testimonial.85 This approach basically 
 
83 Anderson, 2005 WL 858773 at 5-6, citing In re E.H., 823 N.E.2d 1029, 2005 WL 195376 (Ill.App.2005) 
(holding that children’s statements to grandmother that thirteen-year-old babysitter had sexually assaulted 
them a year before were testimonial under Crawford.) (The Anderson court distinguished In re E.H. 
because “[t]he victims' statements were not excited utterances and the statements were not made to the 
authorities.” Anderson, 2005 WL 858773, at 5); Washington v. Powers 99 P.3d 1262, 1263-66 
(Wash.App.2004) (holding that that a tape-recorded 911 call reporting a violation of a domestic violence 
restraining order was a testimonial statement. Where “the Court concluded that the purpose of the 911 call 
was to report a violation of the restraining order to allow the police to apprehend the defendant and was not 
made "under the stress of immediate threat of harm nor was [the defendant] still present."” Anderson, 2005 
WL 858773, at 5 (interpreting Powers), (the Anderson court distinguished Powers based on the fact that 
“the statements were made in response to several questions and by the court's finding that the purpose of 
the call was to initiate a criminal prosecution” Anderson, 2005 WL 858773, at 5); Lopez v. State 888 So.2d 
693,700 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2004) (holding that kidnap victims statement to police identifying the kidnapper 
was testimonial since victim had to know that his statement to the police was a "a formal report of the 
incident that would be used against the defendant.")  
84 Id. 
85 Id. at FN 26 relying on the following authority and comments: “People v. Cage, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 846, 848 
(Cal.App.2004) (holding that hearsay statement made at the hospital to police that defendant had cut him 
was not testimonial because the interview was "unstructured" and "informal and unrecorded") petition for 
review granted 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 824 (Cal.2004); Leavitt v. Arave, 371 F.3d 663, 683 n. 22 (9th Cir.2004) 
(murder victim calls police night before death to report that defendant had broken into her home--court 
concluded that this was excited utterance and non-testimonial because victim initiated contact, was not 
interrogated, and her motive in calling was only to obtain "help in a frightening intrusion into her home"); 
Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 815 (D.C.App.2005) (holding that excited utterances made to police 
officers are testimonial only when given in response to "questioning in a structured environment"); United 
States v. Webb, 2004 WL 2726100, at p.4 (D.C.Super.2004) (Officer dispatched to scene of assault asks 
victim "What happened?" Victim states that defendant punched her in the face. Victim's statement held 
non-testimonial); Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 961-66 (Ind.App.2004) (held that statements to police in 
response to informal police questioning at the scene of a crime shortly after crime occurred are not 
testimonial); State v. Barnes, 854 A.2d 208, 211-12 (Me.2004) (Defendant charged with murder of his 
mother. In an earlier incident, the mother went to police station in tears stating that defendant had tried to 
kill her. Statements admitted as excited utterance. Mother's statements non-testimonial because she had 
gone to the police on her own while under the stress of the alleged assault and police only asked questions 
to determine why she was upset); People v. Bryant, 2004 WL 1882661, at p.1 (Mich.App.2004) (murder 
victim's statement that "Rick shot me" was not testimonial because police had only asked "What 
happened?"); State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22, 29 (N.C.App.2004) (Kidnapping victim's statements to police 
shortly after being rescued were admissible as excited utterances and not testimonial. The police asked no 
questions and victim gave account of crime); People v. Mackey, 785 N.Y.S.2d 870, 874 (N.Y. City Crim. 
Ct.2004) (assault victim's statements to police non-testimonial where she initiated contact with officers 
immediately after defendant punched her--her statements were made to seek immediate protection rather 
than initiate a prosecution, and there was no formal police questioning); People v. Moscat, 777 N .Y.S.2d 
875, 880 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct.2004) (911 call made by domestic violence victim to obtain emergency help 
is non-testimonial. Call made to get help, not to initiate prosecution); People v. Watson, 2004 WL 2567124, 
at p.14 (N.Y.Sup.2004) (Armed robbery victim makes statements to police immediately following crime. 
Victim's first spontaneous statement to police that "that man just robbed me" was not testimonial. Second 
hones in on the “ex-parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent” standard, which 
encompasses police interrogations and ignores the “objective standard”.  The court’s 
analysis focused on the definition of “interrogation”.86 Noting that the Crawford Court 
offered simply the “colloquial” definition of interrogation, the Alaska Court of Appeals 
turned to the dictionary for guidance.87 Based on these definitions the court determined 
that the injured man was not being “interrogated” by the officer when he made the 
accusatory statements since the questioning did not “seem to fall within the category of 
formal, official, and systematic questioning.”88 The court felt that, in formulating its 
opinion, the Supreme Court appeared “to be speaking of more formal statements than the 
single excited response at issue in Anderson’s case.”89 
The Anderson case is a product of other courts holdings and perhaps not the last 
word on Crawford in Alaska.  Indeed Crawford offers many other issues than the one 
decided in Anderson. Given the inevitable presence of other Crawford issues in future 
criminal litigation in Alaska an overview of how the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and 
 
statement in response to police question if there was anyone else involved, that defendant "was the only 
one" was not in response to a "structured question asked with an eye towards trial" but was designed to 
secure the area, and also not testimonial. Victim's further responses to police questioning were testimonial); 
United States v. Griggs, 2004 WL 2676474, at p.5 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (Police officer dispatched to scene hears 
declarant say, "Gun! Gun! He's got a gun!" and observed declarant gesture towards defendant. Statement 
held non-testimonial); State v. Anderson, 2005 WL 174441 (Tenn.Crim.App.2005) (holding that excited 
utterances made to police officers responding to reported crime are not "testimonial"); State v. Maclin,
2005 WL 313977, at p.17 (Tenn.Crim.App.2005) (domestic violence victim's statements made to 
responding police officer were excited utterances and not testimonial); Key v. State, --- S.W.3d ----, 2005 
WL467167, at 5 (Tex.App.2005) (holding that excited utterance made by victim to officer responding to 
scene of assault was not testimonial); State v. Orndorff, 95 P.3d 406, 408 (Wash.App.2004) (where witness 
told police she saw man with a gun downstairs, saw two men leave, was panic-stricken and tried to dial 
911, statement held to be non-testimonial).” 
86 Id. at p. 5 
87 Id. (Defining interrogate as "to examine by questioning formally or officially." American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed.2000) (visited March 23, 2005) http:// 
www.bartleby.com/61/72/I0197200.html.; and "to question formally and systematically" Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary of Law (1996) (visited March 23, 2005) <http://dictionary.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/ 
results.pl?co=dictionary.lp.findlaw.com & topic= 94/94289c09ca673bf97beadcaff2836254>. 
88 Id. at p. 5 
89 Id. at p. 4 
other Ninth Circuit states have been treating the case is merited.  Not surprisingly in 
almost every instance the primary issue revolves around whether a particular piece of 
hearsay evidence qualifies as a “testimonial” statement.  An overview of these cases 
provides an excellent example of how applying a different standard to similar facts will 
result in different outcomes.   
Testimonial vs. Non-testimonial Statements- 9th Circuit Interpretations 
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has taken on the 
“testimonial” definition issue in a few different cases.  For instance, in Parle v. Runnels90 
following a state court conviction of first-degree murder, the Court of Appeals denied a 
defendant’s habeas corpus petition on his Confrontation Clause challenge to the 
introduction of the murder victim’s diary entries.91 The court held the diary entries, 
which contained detailed descriptions of abuse and arguments between the victim and the 
defendant, where not the sort of out-of-court statements that Crawford was concerned 
with because they were non-testimonial.92 In coming to this conclusion the court relied 
upon one of its prior decisions dealing with the “testimonial” issue, Leavit v. Arave93 and 
found that the diary entries where not created “under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that [it] would be available for use at a later 
trial.”94 The court concluded that the diary entries where properly admitted under 
California Evidence Code section 1370, citing the portion of Crawford that reads 
“[w]here nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ 
 
90 387 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. Nov, 2004) 
91 Id. 387 F.3d at 1035-36  
92 Id. 387 F.3d at 1037 
93 383 F.3d 809,830 n.22 (9th Cir. 2004) 
94 Parle, 387 F.3d at 1037 (citing Crawford, 124 S.Ct at 1364 and Leavit, 383 F.3d at 830 n.22 (9th Cir. 
2004)) 
design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as does [Ohio 
v. Roberts], and as would an approach that exempted such statements from confrontation 
Clause scrutiny altogether.”95 
However, in the earlier Arave case, the court used an entirely different standard to 
deny a habeas petition.  There, (as noted above in FN 86) a murder victim's statements to 
police on the night before her death, regarding her suspicions as to identity of the prowler 
at her home, were admitted in the defendant’s subsequent murder trial under Idaho’s 
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.96 Denying the defendants habeas petition 
as to the Confrontation challenge the court found that, “[a]lthough the question is close”, 
the victim’s statements to the police the night before her murder were not testimonial.97 
Instead of using the “objective standard” in reaching this conclusion the court utilized the 
“ex-parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent” standard, which includes police 
interrogations to conclude the statement was not testimonial.98 The court pointed to the 
fact that the victim initiated the contact with the police and that the police where there to 
help and that she was not being interrogated.99 The next case provides a similar example. 
 In the California state appellate case, People v. Compton,100 a murder victim’s 
statements to police, at the crime scene and in the emergency room identifying the 
defendant as the shooter, were admitted into evidence at the defendant’s trial under 
California’s excited utterance exception and an exception for statements purporting to 
narrate or explain the infliction or threat of physical injury upon the declarant.101 On 
 
95 Id. (citing Crawford, 124 U.S. at 1374)  
96 Arave, 383 F.3d at 830 
97 Id. 383 F.3d at 830 n.22 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 2005 WL 236841 (Cal. App. 2 Dist.), Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
101 California Evidence Code section 1240 and 1370. 
appeal the court denied the defendant’s argument that his Confrontation right was 
violated, concluding that the victim’s statements to the police implicating the defendant 
where not testimonial because they were not made in response to police interrogation.102 
The court cited an earlier case where it had determined that “[p]reliminary questions 
asked at the scene of a crime shortly after it has occurred do not rise to the level of an 
‘interrogation.’  Such an unstructured interaction between officer an witness bears no 
resemblance to a formal or informal police inquiry that is required for a police 
interrogation as that term is used in Crawford.”103 The court determined that while at the 
crime scene and the emergency room the police were not conducting a “formal 
investigation in which trial was contemplated”.104 They based this conclusion on the fact 
that there was no suspect under arrest, and no determination had been made whether a 
crime had been committed.105 
Did They Get It Right? 
It is my opinion that the Ninth Circuit was incorrect in its application of Crawford 
in the Leavit case.  There, Crawford was decided after the court had heard oral arguments 
and it appears that the court felt the issue only merited discussion in a single footnote.  
Their analysis is too simplistic.  Had they used the same standard and analysis applied 
months later in the Parle case the result surely would have been different.  Clearly, 
explaining a purported crime to police officers would constitute “circumstances which 
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that [the statements] would be 
 
102 Compare People v. Morgan, 125 Cal.App.4th 935 (2005) (where statements of telephone caller asking to 
buy drugs, which were heard by police officer who answered phone while executing search warrant for 
defendants’ residence, were nontestimonial in character.) 
103 People v. Corella 122 Cal.App.4th 461, 468-69 (2004). 
104 Compton, 2005 WL 236841 at 6. 
105 Id. 
available for use at a later trial.”106 It seems the court completely overlooked this 
standard, perhaps to maintain harmony with the result that it had already reached.  The 
Compton and Corella cases provide similar examples where, in my opinion, the court got 
it wrong. These cases exemplify how applying the “ex-parte in-court testimony or its 
functional equivalent” standard will result in an entirely different result than if the 
“objective standard” would have been used.  To me the California Court of Appeals 
reasoning contains the same flaw as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals above.  Surely the 
victim thought and hoped that the police would use his statements to bring to justice his 
attacker.  Under the objective standard this clearly would qualify as “testimonial” for 
Crawford’s purposes.  Furthermore, I disagree with the court’s reliance on Corella 
because the court focused only on the interrogation question and ignored the other 
standards offered by Crawford. Additionally, it would seem that Corella is inconsistent 
with the purpose of Crawford in terms of what constitutes an interrogation. Corella 
attempts to set a specific time and place on when an interrogation takes place and what an 
interrogation is.  This is completely in conflict with Crawford, which specifically points 
out, the term “interrogation” was meant to be used in its colloquial form and not in any 
“technical legal, sense.”107 By relying upon Corella the California Court of Appeals has 
formulated a technical “legal” definition of interrogation in conflict with the express 
language of Crawford.
In my opinion the Alaska Court of Appeals decision in Anderson suffers from the 
same flaws as listed above.  Courts are taking a conservative approach to Crawford and 
 
106 Lopez v. State 888 So.2d 693, 700 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2004) (Court concluded that kidnap victim had to 
know that his statement to the police, identifying his kidnapper was "a formal report of the incident that 
would be used against the defendant.") 
107 Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1365 n. 4 
in doing so are misinterpreting the case by formulating their own legal definitions of 
interrogation.  Instead of viewing the “objective standard” and the “ex-parte in-court 
testimony or its functional equivalent” standard as separate standards the court seemed to 
mesh the two, or perhaps simply ignored the objective standard so as to be consistent 
with the majority view.  Had the court bothered to at least examine the objective 
standard, instead of dismissing it outright, given the circumstances there, I think it is 
obvious that a person identifying their assailant would reasonably expect that 
identification to be used to arrest the person they identified.  Furthermore, a reasonable 
person in such circumstances would surely expect that his or her identification must be 
used later on in trial.108 Therefore instead of getting bogged down with the definition of 
“interrogation” the court should have simply focused on whether there was a reasonable 
expectation that the identification would have been used at the defendants trial.    
Child Abuse Cases 
The state of Washington, the birthplace of Crawford, offers equally conservative 
interpretations of what constitutes “testimonial”.   In State of Washington v. Fisher,109 a 
child abuse case, the Court of Appeals for the 2nd Division addressed the issue of whether 
statements made to physicians in child abuse situations constitute testimonial statements.  
Relying upon numerous other state cases dealing with the issue,110 the fact that the doctor 
was not a government employee, the fact that the defendant was not yet under suspicion, 
the fact that the doctor testified that she questioned the child only as part of her efforts to 
 
108 Lopez v. State 888 So.2d 693, 700 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2004)  
109 Citation not yet available.  State of Washington v. Fisher ---P.3d.---, slip opinion available at No. 
28282-8-II (Wash.App. Div. 2, March 22, 2005).  
110 See State v. Vaught, 268 Neb. 316 (2004) (finding that a four-year-olds child’s statement’s implicating 
his abuser did not constitute testimonial statements under Crawford.); see also State v. Scacchetti, 690 
N.W.2d 393,396 (Minn.App.2005) (testimony relating a three-year-old’s response when a nurse 
practitioner asked her is anything had happened was not testimonial hearsay.); compare Snowden v. State,
156 Md.App. 139 (2004); People v. Sisavath, 118 Cal.App.4th 1396 (2004). 
properly diagnose and treat the child and thus no indication of a purpose to solicit 
testimony for trial existed, and that an objective observer, under the circumstances, would 
not reasonably foresee the use of the statements in a future trial, the court held that the 
statement was not testimonial and Crawford therefore did not apply.111 Thus the court 
here used the objective standard to determine Crawford did not apply. 
 In another Washington Court of Appeals case, State of Washington v. Dezee112 a 
child rape case, a mother testified as to out of court statements made by her daughter 
indicating that the child’s father had raped her.  In concluding the statements made by the 
child to the mother did not constitute “testimonial” hearsay under Crawford, the court 
relied on the following facts: the child’s statements were spontaneous, they were made to 
her mother while riding in the car to school, the only apparent purpose of the statements 
was expressing the child’ concerns with the acts and seeking comfort from her mother, 
there was no indication that the child ever sought the involvement of the police, and 
nothing in the record indicated that the nine-year-old reasonably believed the statements 
would be available for use at a later trial involving her father.113 Here again the objective 
standard was utilized. 
DUI Reports  
 Montana has recently addressed the increasingly popular strategy of challenging 
reports in DUI cases through Crawford.114 In State of Montana v. Carter115 the 
 
111 Fisher, No. 28282-8-II at paragraphs 29-36. 
112 State of Washington v. Dezee, Unpublished Opinion, slip opinion available at No. 51521-7-I (Wash.App. 
Div 1, Jan. 18, 2005); (available on Westlaw at 5 WL 246190); see also State of Idaho v. Doe, 103 P.3d 
967, 970 (Idaho Ct. App., 2004) (admittance of Child sexual assault victim’s statements to mother and 
grandmother describing incident did not violate Crawford). 
113 Id. at p. 4 
114 See Kapsack, Bruce and Oberman, Steven, Crawford v. Washington: The DUI Defense Practitioner’s 
Perspective, 28 Champion 25, 26 (September/October, 2004), (offering the proposition that “[a] machine 
and its results are clearly testimonial.”). 
defendant claimed that his right to confront witnesses against him was violated when the 
state introduced three certification reports (weekly, monthly, yearly) for a breath analysis 
machine but failed to proffer the individual who compiled the reports for cross-
examination.116 The court determined that certification reports for breath testing 
instruments do not constitute “testimonial” hearsay and therefore does not raise a 
Confrontation issue because “certification reports are not substantive evidence of a 
particular offense, but rather are foundational evidence necessary for the admission of 
substantive evidence.”117 However, many defense practitioners would disagree with 
Montana courts decision.  They would take the argument a step further claiming that, not 
only must the person who performed the calibration or performed the actual breath test be 
present at trial for cross examination, the also a technician who could testify to the “inner 
workings” of the machine itself must also be present.118 A DUI practitioner’s article on 
the subject offers the following argument: 
“A machine and its results are clearly testimonial.  In fact, it is the piece of 
testimony necessary, and indeed often the only one needed, to prove a per se 
charge.  That being said, aren’t the inner workings of the machine necessarily 
testimonial? …The printout of the machine is in court ‘saying,’ “here is the breath 
(or blood) alcohol content of Mr. Defendant.”  If this were a live person, the first 
question we would ask is how did you determine this result?  We would clearly be 
allowed to ask about the science used, the calculations made, and the procedures 
followed; yet, because it is a machine, we are denied this confrontation.”119 
Some would argue that this type of reasoning is just another example of lawyers 
trying to find loopholes for their clients and exploit the protections offered by our 
Constitution.  However, as technology progresses so must the law.  As our society 
 
115 Citation not yet available.  State of Montana v. Carter ---P.3d.---, slip opinion available at No. 03-563 
(Mont. April 5, 2005) (available on Westlaw at 2005 WL 767264 (Mont.)) 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at p. 8 
118 Kapsack, 28 Champion 25, 26 
119 Id. 
becomes increasingly dependent upon technology the likelihood that they will trust it 
increases.  This could have significant ramifications if you are a resolute government 
conspiracy theorist.  Indeed, it is shocking to think that our freedom could hinge upon a 
machine.  However, as the Kapsack article surmises, “our constitution does not yet 
provide for conviction by machine”.120 I do not know whether I agree with that statement 
or not, but I do know that Crawford will be the medium within which that battle is 
fought.   
 
Excited Utterance Heard by Lay Witness 
 An Arizona appellate court tackled the issue as to whether an excited utterance, a 
hearsay-excepted statement, heard by a lay witness qualifies as testimonial under 
Crawford.121 There, two out of court statements, one overheard by the victim’s son and 
one the victim made to her brother-in-law over the phone the night before she was 
murdered, were admitted into evidence under the “excited utterance” exception to the bar 
on hearsay evidence.  The court held that “an excited utterance heard and testified to by a 
lay witness does not fit within Crawford’s definition of testimonial…”.  The court 
reasoned that Arizona State’s definition of an excited utterance122 is not “even remotely 
similar to most of what Crawford offers as an example of a testimonial statement.”123 
Specifically, the court reviewed the three standards outlined in Crawford and 
 
120 Id. 
121 State of Arizona v. Aguilar, 107 P.3d 377 (March, 2005). 
122 “[U]nder certain circumstances of physical or mental shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be 
produced in a spectator which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance 
which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perception already 
produced by the external shock.  Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled 
domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, and during the brief period when consideration  
of self-interest could not have been fully brought to bear, the utterance may be taken as expressing the real 
belief of the speaker as to the facts just observed by him”.  Aguilar, 107 P.3d at 379; (quoting Keefe v. 
State, 72 P.2d 425, 427 (1937)). 
123 Id. 107 P.3d at 379. 
distinguished each one pointing to the fact that an excited utterance is not a solemn, 
formal declaration nor is it the sort that would be found in ex-parte in-court testimony or 
its functional equivalent; nor would a person making such an utterance reasonably expect 
it to be used later in trial when they have no time to reflect on what they have said.124 In 
holding that excited utterances heard by lay witnesses are non-testimonial the court also 
cited other jurisdictions dealing with this issue and coming to the same conclusion.125 
The court did note that in situations where the excited utterance is made in response to a 
police officer’s questions there might be more room for a Crawford challenge.126 
Co-Defendants Statements  
In State of Oregon v. Page127 the Oregon Court of Appeals dealt with, what has 
always been one of the most prevalent areas raising confrontation issues, hearsay 
evidence of co-defendant’s statements to police.  There the primary defendant was 
convicted of several felonies stemming from a robbery committed by two men after the 
initial arrestee made statements to the police implicating the primary defendant in the 
felonies and made a deal to testify against the primary defendant for a reduced 
sentence.128 However, when the primary defendant’s trial came to pass the initial arrestee 
 
124 Id. 
125 See State v. Orndorff, 95 P.3d 406, 408 (Wash. App. 2004) (court came to same conclusion reasoning 
that the declarant had no reason to expect the statement would be used by prosecutors, the statement was 
not made to establish or prove a fact, and it was not a statement made in response to police questioning.); 
People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258,265(Colo.App.2004); People v. Compan, 100 P.3d 533,538 (Colo.App. 
2004); Doe, 103 P.3d 967,972; People v. Rivera, 8 A.D.3d 53 (N.Y App.Div. 2004). 
126 Aguilar, 107 P.3d at 379 (providing two examples with opposite results, Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 
960,964 (Ind.App. 2004) (court admitted excited utterance made to police officer at scene because 
“[w]hatever else police ‘interrogation’ might be, we do not believe that word applies to preliminary 
investigatory questions asked at the scene of a crime shortly after it has occurred.”); Lopez, 888 So.2d at 
700 (Fla.App. 2004) (holding that excited utterance to police was testimonial because “[the declarant] 
surely must have expected that the statement he made to Officer Gaston might be used in court against the 
defendant.”)). 
127 State of Oregon v. Page, 104 P.3d 616 (2005) 
128 Id.
refused to testify.  The trial court deemed the initial arrestee unavailable129 and admitted 
his interview statements under Oregon’s statement against penal interest exception to the 
hearsay bar.130 This was before Crawford had been decided.  On appeal the court 
determined that the trial court’s admission into evidence of the testimonial hearsay 
evidence of the unavailable codefendant’s statements to police violated Crawford and 
was plain error.131 The court relied on the “police interrogation” benchmark provided by 
the Crawford Court in determining that the statements where testimonial.132 
911 Calls   
Finally there is the growing controversy over how Crawford should apply to 911 
calls.  This issue has sparked numerous opinions from both academics and courts.133 
The determining factor seems to be whether the police dispatcher elicited statements 
from the caller in a structured manner. 134 Courts appear to be split on the issue, New 
York in particular has had several conflicting decisions.135 These cases demonstrate that 
it is not clear whether it is the perception of the caller that matters or whether it is the 
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purpose of the police dispatcher that is determinative in deciding whether a 911 call is 
testimonial or not. Within the Ninth Circuit courts are equally divided.  In contrast to 
the Conyers case, Washington v. Powers,136 a Washington Court of Appeals decision, 
held that a tape-recorded 911 call reporting a violation of a domestic violence 
restraining order was a testimonial statement.137 The court recognized that there were 
two types of 911 calls, those were the caller’s objective is to “gain immediate official 
assistance in ending or relieving an exigent, perhaps dangerous situation,” and those 
where the caller seeks to “provide information to aid investigation to aid investigation 
and possible prosecution related to the situation.”138 Based on the facts of the case 
before them the court determined that the purpose of the 911 call was to report the 
violation of the restraining order so as to secure the arrest of the defendant and was not 
made "under the stress of immediate threat of harm nor was [the defendant] still 
present."139 Because the caller sought to provide information for the defendants arrest 
the statement was testimonial. 
California, on the other hand, has taken a different approach.  Instead of 
differentiating between 911 calls where the caller seeks “immediate assistance” or seeks 
to provide “information for prosecution”, California courts have simplified the issue by 
embracing an all encompassing rule that “a telephone call to the police reporting a 
crime, is not a testimonial statement.”140 
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“A telephone call reporting a crime is not "given in response to structured police 
questioning" related to a formal investigation. Rather, a citizen, often seeking 
assistance, initiates the call. The operator receiving the call is not conducting an 
investigation, but seeking information to determine an appropriate response to 
the crime.  Thus, statements made during a telephone call reporting a crime do 
not implicate the right to confront witnesses.”141 
The California court’s line of reasoning is questionable.  Washington seems to be 
more in line with the spirit of Crawford. Fortunately, the Supreme Court has granted 
review in another California case that determined a 911 call was not a testimonial 
statement.142 This could be the first step at carving out an actual hard core definition of 
testimonial. 
Harmless Error and Retroactivity 
 In another Ninth Circuit Appellate case the court found that the introduction of 
out-of-court statements of a defendant’s girlfriend to police during a search, which 
indicated that the defendant was the only one that could access a safe containing drugs, 
was in violation of Crawford.143 The court found that the statements were testimonial but 
offered no reasoning as to why they merited such designation.144 However, the court 
ultimately determined that the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
considering the minor importance of the statements and the overwhelming evidence of 
the defendant’s guilt.145 
In Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3rd 1010 (9th Cir. Feb, 2005), a more recent Ninth 
Circuit habeas petition, the court addressed whether Crawford applies retroactively and 
revisited the harmless error doctrine.  In Bockting the defendant was convicted of child 
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sexual abuse and sentenced to life imprisonment.  The only witness to the conduct was 
his six-year old stepdaughter who did not testify at trial but whose interview with a 
detective was admitted as key evidence.  The statements of the step-daughter at the 
interview contradicted statements the she made at a preliminary hearing, where she said 
she could not remember what occurred with her father or whether she had talked with the 
detective.  The judge declared the stepdaughter an unavailable witness given the fact that 
she could not remember and admitted the interview statements.  The Court of Appeals 
determined that admission of the interview statements without cross-examination was a 
violation of Crawford. Applying the test for retroactivity outlined in Teage v. Lane,146 
the court found that Crawford was both a “watershed rule” and “one without which the 
likelihood of an accurate conviction was seriously diminished, and therefore applied 
retroactively in the pending habeas proceeding”.147 In addressing the harmless error 
argument the court found that because the stepdaughter’s testimony was central to the 
defendant’s conviction “its admission can hardly be classified as harmless error.”148 
Conclusion 
 
The examples above make clear that there is no one test to apply and that 
inconsistency is rampant when it comes to the Crawford issue.  It appears that, in 
determining whether a statement is testimonial, the states within the Ninth Circuit and the 
Circuit Court of Appeals itself, place emphasis on whichever standard outlined by the 
Crawford Court will ultimately gain the result they deem fit in the underlying case.  This 
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has led to inconsistency from state to state.  Nonetheless, one thing is clear, courts have 
adopted a rather conservative approach to Crawford.
It is my hope that this article illustrates how important it is for practitioners in 
states that have not tackled the Crawford issue to keep up to speed with how their 
particular circuits are interpreting the issues presented here.  It is even more important 
that practitioners have a working knowledge of the standards outlined in Crawford for 
determining a testimonial statement so as to be able to make proficient arguments and 
understand their implications, especially if they disagree with how their circuit is 
interpreting the case.  For now Alaska has taken the position that “an excited utterance by 
a crime victim to a police officer, made in response to minimal questioning, is not 
testimonial”.149 However, the Anderson decision address only one issue in the myriad of 
issues that Crawford encompasses.  For Alaska practitioners, I believe it is a safe bet that 
future Alaska Appellate cases will continue the national trend and produce similar 
conservative decisions.  It appears that more instruction will be available in the near 
future, the Crawford issue is again knocking at the doors of the Supreme Court at this 
very moment.150 
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